INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT OF THE
MECHANICAL ACTUATION
SUBSYSTEM
VOLUME 2 OF 2

7 MARCH 1988

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9100A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4F-032001-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9100
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [X]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9100   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-4F-032001-3   BASELINE [   ]
                                                      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9100
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9101A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4F-032001-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9101
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9101
NASA FMEA #:   02-4F-032001-4

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9101
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9100B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4F-032001-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9100
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6211   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-151-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6211
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE MDAC ID 6211 FOR EFFECTS AND
RATIONALE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6212
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-151-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6212
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE MDAC ID 6211 FOR EFFECTS AND
RATIONALE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6212A
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-151-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6212
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16513X
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-152-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16513
ITEM: LINKAGE ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6213.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6213
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-152-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6213
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
FOR STRUCTURAL FAILURE OTHER THAN BINDING/JAMMING LINKAGE WOULD
PROBABLY BE BROKEN/DISCONNECTED IN A "FAILS FREE" MODE. IN THIS
CASE REMAINING ACTUATOR/CRANK SHOULD DRIVE THE PANEL TO THE STOW
STATE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6201   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-153-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6201
ITEM: MOTOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6203
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-153-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6203
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6207   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-154-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6207
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6208   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-154-3   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6208
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88

ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6205

NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-155-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6205
ITEM: TORQUE LIMITER

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6204   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-155-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6204
ITEM: TORQUE LIMITER

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6301   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-156-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6301
ITEM: HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6302
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-156-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6302
ITEM: HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] * [ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16511X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-157-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16511
ITEM: BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT SUPPORT

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

                [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6211A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-158-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6211
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6113   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-176-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6113
ITEM: LATCH HOOK MECHANISM

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [X]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
WORSE CASE FAILURE WOULD BE LOSS OF ABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH A
LATCH PAIR. THIS WILL NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE AND SHOULD
BE CRITICALITY THREE (3).

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6103
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-179-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6103
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6107   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-180-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6107
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6108   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-180-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                            NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6108
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6111
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-181-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW   [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6111
ITEM: LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6112
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-181-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6112
ITEM: LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
SHOULD BE A CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO LATCH
A SINGLE LATCH PAIR SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6112A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-182-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6112
ITEM: LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

REC   NS: (If different from NASA)

           /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* C   ON RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE   [   ]
REM
IOA   AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
SHO   RITICALITY THREE (3) AS THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO LATCH
A S   H PAIR SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6105   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-183-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6105
ITEM: TORQUE LIMITER

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                     ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE [X]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
FAILURE TO ENGAGE OF OUR TORQUE LIMITER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ROTARY
INPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR. OTHER DRIVE MOTOR SHOULD EFFECT
RELEASE/LATCH STATE IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME. SHOULD BE A
CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS MISSION CONTINUANCE NOT AFFECTED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSE   'E: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSE   :   MECH/PBR-6104   BASELINE [   ]
NAS/   02-4G-183-2   NEW [X]

SUB!   MECH/PBR
MDA(6104
ITE]   TORQUE LIMITER

LEA!   W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASS:

CALITY ,IGHT /FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	A	B	C	
/1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
/3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COM /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

REC   )NS: (If different from NASA)

      /]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* (ION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
RE]
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16514X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-184-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16514
ITEM: ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH RADIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6302A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-186-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6302
ITEM: HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [X]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16512X
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-301-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16512
ITEM: SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT, RADIATOR STOWED

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6501   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-65G-2001-01   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6501
ITEM: LATCH CONTROL SWITCH (S4/S6)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6502,
6503, 6504.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6502
NASA FMEA #:   05-65G-2001-01

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6502
ITEM: LATCH CONTROL SWITCH (S4/S6)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6503, 6504.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6503
NASA FMEA #:   05-65G-2001-01

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6503
ITEM: LATCH CONTROL SWITCH (S4/S6)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6502, 6504.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6504
NASA FMEA #:   05-65G-2001-01

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6504
ITEM: LATCH CONTROL SWITCH (S4/S6)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ] [ ] [ ]   [ ]
                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                            ADEQUATE [X]
                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6502, 6503.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107D
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2026A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8107
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108D
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2026A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8108
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502D
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2026A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2027-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8107
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2027-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8108
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
                 FLIGHT                                      ITEM
               HDW/FUNC        A          B         C

       NASA  [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]     [ P ]      [ X ] *
        IOA  [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ NA]     [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE     [   /   ]       [   ]      [ N ]     [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]         [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [X]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2027-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE [X]
                                INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2028

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8107
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2028

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8108
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2028

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107C
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2029-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8107
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108C   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2029-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8108
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502C   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2029-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
       IOA [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107E
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2030A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8107
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                           ADEQUATE   [X]
                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2030A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8108
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502E   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2030A-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [X]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2031A

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8107
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2031A   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8108
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2031A   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2126-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2128-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503C   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2129-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503D
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2130-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503E   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2130-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503J
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2133-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                      ADEQUATE   [X]
                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503F   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2134-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503G
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2135-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503H   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2138-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503I   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2139-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2177-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8503
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8511A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2201-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8511
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8512A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2201-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8512
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8513A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2201-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8513
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8517A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2201-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8517
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8511
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2202-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8511
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8512   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2202-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8512
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
         IOA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [X]
                                   INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8513   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2202-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8513
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8517   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2202-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
LRU ID: 8517
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [X]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
: AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8511B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2204-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8511
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8512B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2204-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8512
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8513B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2204-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8513
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8517B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2204-2

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [ ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8517
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2252-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8507
ITEM: MCA DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8508   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6AB-2252-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8508
ITEM: MCA DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5502   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5502
ITEM: CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [X]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2001-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5504
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5504A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2001-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5504
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[　]	[N]	[　]	[　]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5507   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2004-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5507
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5507A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2004-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5507
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

      NASA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ X ] *
       IOA   [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [ /  ]       [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5508
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2004-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5508
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5507B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2005-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5507
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                      ADEQUATE [X]
                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5508A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2005-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5508
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5507C
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2005-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5507
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5508B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2005-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5508
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE [X]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5504B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2010-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5504
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5504C   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2010-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5504
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
     IOA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5505
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EB-2011-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5505
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3505   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2026-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3505
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [X]
                                 INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3506
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2026-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3506
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3505A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2026-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3505
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ] [ ] [ ]   [ ]
                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE [X]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3506A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2026-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3506
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3507   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2027-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3507
ITEM: CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [X]
                                   INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2027-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3508
ITEM: CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3507A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2027-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3507
ITEM: CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE [X]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3508A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2027-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3508
ITEM: CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3509
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2028-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3509
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3510
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2028-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3510
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3509A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2030-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3509
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3510A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2030-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3510
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501G BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2126-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
              ADEQUATE [X]
             INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503E
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2126-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2127-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [X]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3502
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2127-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3502
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

              ADEQUATE   [X]
              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2127-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

     NASA  [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ X ] *
     IOA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE    [   /   ]     [   ]     [ N ]     [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [X]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3502A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2127-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3502
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [X]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2129-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2129-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501C   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2130-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [X]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2130-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501D   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2131-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2131-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501E   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2131-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503C
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2131-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501F
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2132-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2132-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                          ADEQUATE [X]
                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2250-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522E
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2251A-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523G   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2251A-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522F
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2251A-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                ADEQUATE   [X]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523H   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2251A-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

    NASA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522C   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2251B-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523E   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2251B-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2252-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523C
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2252-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2252B-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　　[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523F
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2252B-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2252C-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                            NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2255-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
    IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2257-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523D
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2257-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6ED-2257A-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11700X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2001-1   NEW   [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11700
ITEM: FUSE (1A) MOTOR POWER CONTROL

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1500A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1502A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1503A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

    ADEQUATE   [   ]
    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1504A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1507A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[F]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.   IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1509A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1510A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.   IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1511A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1512A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1512
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.   IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1513A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1514A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1514
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1515A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1516
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1517A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1518A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1518
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1519A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1520A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1520
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1521A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1522A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1522
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1523A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1532A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1532
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1533A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1534A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1535A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1536A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1536
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1537A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1538A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1538
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1539A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1540A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1540
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1542A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1543A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1543
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1544A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1545A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1546A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1547A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1547
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1548A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1549A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1549
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1550A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1551A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1552A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1553A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1553
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1554A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1555A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1500
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1502
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1503
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1504
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]				[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1507
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1510
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1512
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1513
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1514
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1514
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1516
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1517   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1518
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
					[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1519   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1520   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1520
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1521
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1522
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1523
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1532
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1532
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1533
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1533
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1534   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
              ADEQUATE [ ]
              INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1535
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1536
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1536
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1537   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
              ADEQUATE [   ]
            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1538
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1539
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [2 /1R] | [P] | [F] | [P] | [A] (ADD/DELETE) |

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1540
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1540
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1542
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1543
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1544
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[　]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]　　[P]　　[F]　　[P]　　[A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1547   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1547
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                FLIGHT                                     ITEM
                HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

      NASA    [ 1 /1  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [ X ] *
       IOA    [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ X ]

  COMPARE     [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]       [ A ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1548   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1549   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1549
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1551   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1552
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1553   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1553
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

     NASA  [ 1 /1 ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [ X ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /3 ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1554   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1524A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1524
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1525A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1526A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1526
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1527A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1528A   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                               NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1528
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1529A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1529
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1530A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1530
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1531A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1531
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A          B          C

     NASA  [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]     [ N ]      [ N ]      [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1524B   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1524
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1525B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[x] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1526B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1526
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                           ADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1527B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1528B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1528
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1529B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1529
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1530B
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1530
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                     ADEQUATE   [   ]
                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1531B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1531
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
                 FLIGHT                                      ITEM
               HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

      NASA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]      [   ] *
      IOA    [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ X ]

COMPARE      [ N /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [ N ]
```


RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
             [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]      [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)
```


* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1524   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1524
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1525   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE [   ]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1526
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1526
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1527   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   C-753

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1528   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1528
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1529
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1529
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1530   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1530
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1531
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2003-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1531
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1565
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1565
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1567   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1567
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1573
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1573
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1575   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1575
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1581   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1581
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1583
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1583
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1564
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1564
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1566   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1566
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1572   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1572
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE   [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1574
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1574
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[x] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1580
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1580
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1582   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2004-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1582
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1569   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1569
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1571   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1571
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1577   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1577
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                    ITEM
               HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

       NASA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]    [   ]     [   ]      [   ] *
        IOA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]    [   ]     [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE       [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]     [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
              [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]    [   ]     [   ]        [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1579
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1579
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ] [   ] [   ]   [   ]
                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1585   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1585
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1587   BASELINE [　]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1587
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[　] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[　]
COMPARE	[　/　]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[　]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [　]   [　]   [　]   [　]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE [　]
                         INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1568   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1568
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
           HDW/FUNC      A          B          C

     NASA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]     [   ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]      [ F ]      [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE    [   /   ]    [   ]      [ N ]      [   ]     [ N ]
```


RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]        [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)
```


* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1570
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1570
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1576
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1576
ITEM: RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88　　　　　　　NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:　MECH/ADP-1578　　　　　BASELINE [　]
NASA FMEA #:　　05-6EE-2005-2　　　　　　　　NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:　　　MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID:　　　　1578
ITEM:　　　　　　RELAY DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST:　　A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[　] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[　/　]	[　]	[N]	[　]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS:　(If different from NASA)

　　　　[3 /1R]　　　[P]　　　[P]　　　[P]　　　[　]
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ADEQUATE　　[　]
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INADEQUATE　[　]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1584   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1584
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1586   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2005-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1586
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11701X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2006-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11701
ITEM: RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11702X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2007-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11702
ITEM: RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11703X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2008-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11703
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11704X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2008-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11704
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11705X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2009-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11705
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11706X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2009-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11706
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ] [   ] [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE [   ]
                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11707X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2012-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11707
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11708X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2012-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11708
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1628
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1628
ITEM: POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

C·4

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1629   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1629
ITEM: POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

          CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
            FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1630   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1630
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1631
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1631
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1632
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1632
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1633   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1633
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[x] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1634   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1634
ITEM: THERMISTER THERMOMETER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1635   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1635
ITEM: THERMISTER THERMOMETER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
              FLIGHT                                       ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

  NASA    [ 3 /3 ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ x ] *
   IOA    [ 3 /3 ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ X ]

COMPARE   [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]        [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1636   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                          NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1636
ITEM: FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1637
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1637
ITEM: FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1638
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1638
ITEM: CONTROL CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1639
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1639
ITEM: CONTROL CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]　　[P]　　[P]　　[P]　　[　]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1640   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                               NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1640
ITEM: READ ONLY MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1641   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1641
ITEM: READ ONLY MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1642   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1642
ITEM: TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1643   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1643
ITEM: TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                    ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

      NASA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ X ] *
       IOA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ X ]

  COMPARE    [   /   ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]       [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.   LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1644   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1644
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1645
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1645
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1646
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1646
ITEM: TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1647   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1647
ITEM: TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                 ITEM
            HDW/FUNC     A        B        C

    NASA  [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE   [   /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]     [    ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1648   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1648
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
                 FLIGHT                                 ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

      NASA  [ 3 /3  ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
       IOA  [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE   [    /N  ]       [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]         [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1649   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1649
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1650
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1650
ITEM: SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1651
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1651
ITEM: SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1652
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1652
ITEM: BINARY COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
                                            [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1653
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1653
ITEM: BINARY COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1654   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1654
ITEM: ADDRESSABLE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1655
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1655
ITEM: ADDRESSABLE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[-]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1656
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1656
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1657   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1657
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1658   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1658
ITEM: SWITCHING LADDER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1659
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1659
ITEM: SWITCHING LADDER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1660   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1660
ITEM: POLARITY DETECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1661   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1661
ITEM: POLARITY DETECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

     NASA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE     [   /N  ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]        [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1662   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1662
ITEM: CONTROL LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1663
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1663
ITEM: CONTROL LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1664   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1664
ITEM: REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1665   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1665
ITEM: REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1666   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1666
ITEM: DISCREET INPUT BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1667
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1667
ITEM: DISCREET INPUT BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1668   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1668
ITEM: SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1669   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1669
ITEM: SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1670
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1670
ITEM: OSCILLATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88　　　　　　　NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:　MECH/ADP-1671　　　　　BASELINE [　]
NASA FMEA #:　　05-6EE-2014-1　　　　　　　　NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:　　MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID:　　　1671
ITEM:　　　　　OSCILLATOR

LEAD ANALYST:　A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS:　(If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]　　　[P]　　[P]　　[P]　　　[　]
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ADEQUATE　[　]
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.　LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1672
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1672
ITEM: 2 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1673   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1673
ITEM: 2 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1674   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1674
ITEM: 1 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1675
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1675
ITEM: 1 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1676
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1676
ITEM: 500 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1677
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1677
ITEM: 500 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]　　[P]　　[P]　　[P]　　[　]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1678
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1678
ITEM: COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1679   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1679
ITEM: COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
         CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
            FLIGHT                                 ITEM
           HDW/FUNC     A        B        C

   NASA  [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ] *
    IOA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ X ]

COMPARE  [   /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
         [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]        [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1680   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1680
ITEM: OR GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1681
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1681
ITEM: OR GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1682
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1682
ITEM: SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1683   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1683
ITEM: SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[F]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1684   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1684
ITEM: BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1685
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1685
ITEM: BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1686
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1686
ITEM: OUTPUT CONTROL

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
[   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1687   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1687
ITEM: OUTPUT CONTROL

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1688   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [ ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1688
ITEM: ENCODER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1689
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1689
ITEM: ENCODER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1690
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1690
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1691
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1691
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1692
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1692
ITEM: CPU

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1693
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1693
ITEM: CPU

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1694
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1694
ITEM: SELECTOR LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1695   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1695
ITEM: SELECTOR LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1696   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1696
ITEM: READ ONLY MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   C-858

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1697
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1697
ITEM: ROM

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1698   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1698
ITEM: READ/WRITE MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
                                                    [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1699   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1699
ITEM: READ/WRITE MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1601   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2015-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1601
ITEM: SWITCH RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
            FLIGHT                                     ITEM
           HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

   NASA  [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [   ] *
   IOA   [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE  [   /   ]      [   ]    [ N ]    [   ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1603
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2015-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1603
ITEM: LATCH RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1600   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2015-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1600
ITEM: SWITCH RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD ALLOW HEATER TO DAMAGE PROBE
CAUSING LOSS OF ADTAS DATA DURING FLIGHT. REVIEW SHOWED LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WAS READILY APPARENT HOWEVER, PASSING SCREEN
B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1602   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2015-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: LATCH RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD ALLOW HEATER TO DAMAGE PROBE
CAUSING LOSS OF ADTAS DATA DURING FLIGHT. REVIEW SHOWED LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WAS READILY APPARENT HOWEVER, PASSING SCREEN
B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1595   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1595
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1597
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1597
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1599
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1599
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1594   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1594
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1596   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1596
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1598
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1598
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2017-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1589
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1591
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1591
ITEM: TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1593
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1593
ITEM: SOLID STATE DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/18/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1588   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1588
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1590   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1590
ITEM: TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1592
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1592
ITEM: SOLID STATE DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9500
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EF-2003-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 9500
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9500A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EF-2003-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 9500
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16515X   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EG-2009-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16515
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6507
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6508,
6509, 6510.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6508
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EG-2010-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6508
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507,
6509, 6510.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6509A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EG-2010-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6509
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507, 6508, 6510.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6510A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6510
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507, 6508, 6509.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6509   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EG-2010-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6509
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6510.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6510
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EG-2010-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 6510
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6510.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16516X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EG-2017-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16516
ITEM: MID MCA 1, 2, 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [X]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                               NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT, PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
					[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4529   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4529
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
         IOA [3 /2R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
                                                        [X]

     COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
                                                      [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4531
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4533
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4535
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4537   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                               NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4539
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4540
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4540
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4541
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4541
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4542   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT, PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523A   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
             FLIGHT                                     ITEM
          HDW/FUNC      A          B          C

   NASA   [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]     [ X ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]      [ F ]      [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]    [   ]      [ N ]      [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]       [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4529A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4529
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4531
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]

SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4533
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4535A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4537A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

               CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
       IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /   ]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4539A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4540A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4540
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4541A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASLINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4541
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4542A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4516
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4516
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4518   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4518
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4520   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4520
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4522
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4524
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4524
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4526
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4526
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4528
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4528
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4530   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4530
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4532
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4532
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4534
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4536   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4536
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4538   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4538
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14688X   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56004-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14688
ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOY CONTROL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   C-930

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14689X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56007-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14689
ITEM: DIODE (STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14690X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56010-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14690
ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14691X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56010-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14691
ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

             [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14692X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56011-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14692
ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14693X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56011-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14693
ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4547
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4547
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4549
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4549
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4555   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4555
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4557
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4557
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4563
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4563
ITEM: K72

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4565
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4565
ITEM: K70

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4569
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4569
ITEM: DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4575
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4575
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4577   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4577
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4583
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4583
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4585   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4585
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
      IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4592
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4592
ITEM: K27

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4594
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4594
ITEM: K37

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4598   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56020-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4598
ITEM: DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4543   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4543
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4545
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4551   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4551
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4553
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4553
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                ADEQUATE   [   ]
              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4559
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4559
ITEM: K14

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                 ADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4561
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4561
ITEM: K68

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4567   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4567
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4571
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4571
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4573
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4573
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[A] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4579   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4579
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4581
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4581
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4587
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4587
ITEM: K25

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4589   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4589
ITEM: K2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4596
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14694X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56051-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14694
ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOY POS. INDICATION)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]　[ ]　[ ]　[ ]　　　　[ ]
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14695X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56054-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14695
ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
              FLIGHT                                      ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

   NASA  [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [ X ] *
    IOA  [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE  [   /   ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
         [   /   ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]         [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14696X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56054-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MEH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14696
ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14697X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56055-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14697
ITEM: FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14698X   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56056-1   BASELINE [ ]
                                               NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14698
ITEM: DIODE (STOW INITIATE)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14699X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56057-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14699
ITEM: FUSE (STOW INITIATE)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
            FLIGHT                                       ITEM
           HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

   NASA  [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [ X ] *
    IOA  [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE  [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]          [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION.   FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4505
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE   [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4509   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                 CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

         NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [X] *
         IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[A]
				(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4505A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4509A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4500   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   BASELINE [   ]
                                               NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4500
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4502
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4502
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4504
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
ITEM: 4504
                 +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4506   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4506
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4508   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4508
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4510
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[　]	[N]	[　]	[　]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]　　[P]　　[F]　　[P]　　[A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4512
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4512
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4514   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4514
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.

APPENDIX D

CRITICAL ITEMS

APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
02-4-052000-1	1101	MOTOR	FAILS TO OPERATE
02-4-052000-4	1101	MOTOR	FAILS TO OPERATE
02-4-054000-1	1104	PRESSURE LINE	LEAKAGE
	1105	PROBE	JAMMED
	1106	PROBE	CLOGGED PORT
	1107	SHAFT	BROKEN
	1108	SHAFT	BENT
05-6EE-2002-1	1500	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1500	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1501	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1501	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1502	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1502	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1503	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1503	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1504	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1504	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1505	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1505	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1506	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1506	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1507	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1507	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1508	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1508	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1509	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1509	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1510	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1510	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1511	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1511	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1512	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1512	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1513	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1513	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1514	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1514	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1515	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1515	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1516	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1516	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1517	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1517	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1518	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1518	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-6EE-2002-1	1519	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1519	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1520	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1520	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1521	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1521	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1522	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1522	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1523	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1523	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1532	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1532	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1533	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1534	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1534	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1534	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1535	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1535	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1536	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1536	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1537	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1537	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1538	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1538	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1539	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1539	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1540	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1540	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1541	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1541	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1542	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1542	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1543	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1543	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1544	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1544	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1545	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1545	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1546	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1546	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1547	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1547	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1548	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1548	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1549	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1549	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1550	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1550	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1551	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1551	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-6EE-2002-1	1552	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1552	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1553	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1553	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-1	1554	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-2	1554	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2002-1	1555	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2002-2	1555	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2017-2	1588	AND GATE	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2017-1	1589	AND GATE	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2017-2	1590	TIME DELAY	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2017-1	1591	TIME DELAY	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2017-2	1592	SOLID STATE DRIVER	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2017-1	1593	SOLID STATE DRIVER	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2016-2	1594	REMOTE POWER CONTROLL	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2016-1	1595	REMOTE POWER CONTROLL	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2016-2	1596	REMOTE POWER CONTROLL	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2016-1	1597	REMOTE POWER CONTROLL	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2016-2	1598	REMOTE POWER CONTROLL	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2016-1	1599	REMOTE POWER CONTROLL	FAILS OPEN
05-6EE-2015-2	1600	SWITCH RELAY	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EE-2015-2	1602	LATCH RELAY	FAILS SHORTED
02-2D/4-E100-1	2100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-2D/4-E100-1	2101	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-2D/4-E100-1	2102	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-2D/4-E100-1	2103	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-2D/4-E100-1	2104	BOLT	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-2D/4-E100-1	2105	BOLT	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-014600-1	3101	CENTERLINE LATCH MOTO	FAILS TO START
02-4D-014600-1	3103	CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUT	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-014600-3	3104	CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAK	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4D-014600-1	3105	CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAK	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-014000-3	3106	CENTERLINE LATCH DIFF	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-014600-1	3107	CENTERLINE LATCH DIFF	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-014000-1	3108	CENTERLINE LATCH	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-14700-2	3109	CENTERLINE LATCH LIMI	PREMATURE OPER
02-4D-012600-1	3111	DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR	FAILS TO START
02-4D-012600-1	3113	DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CL	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-012600-3	3114	DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BR	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4D-012600-1	3115	DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BR	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-012000-1	3116	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-012600-5	3116	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-013600-5	3116	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-012600-1	3117	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-012600-4	3117	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-013600-4	3117	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-013600-5	3117	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-012100-1	3119	DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY	LINKAGE BROKEN
02-4D-012100-2	3120	HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBL	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-012100-1	3121	HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBL	LINKAGE BROKEN

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
02-4D-012100-2	3122	DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE T	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-012100-1	3123	DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE T	TORQUE TUBE BROKE
02-4D-012700-2	3124	DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SW	PREMATURE OPER
02-4D-012100-2	3126	DOOR HINGE	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-012100-1	3127	DOOR HINGE	STRUCTURAL FAILUR
02-4D-013300-2	3128	DOOR UPLATCH ROLLER	BROKEN OFF DOOR
02-4D-013300-2	3129	UMBILICAL DOOR	DAMAGED ON ASCENT
02-4D-013600-1	3130	UPLOCK LATCH MOTOR	FAILS TO START
02-4D-013600-5	3131	UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4D-013600-1	3132	UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-013600-5	3132	UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-013600-3	3133	UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4D-013600-1	3134	UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4D-012600-5	3135	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-013000-1	3135	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-012600-5	3136	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-013600-1	3136	TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4D-013300-1	3137	UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE A	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-013300-2	3138	UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE A	TORQUE TUBE BROKE
02-4D-013300-1	3139	INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-013300-2	3140	INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH	BROKEN/UNATTACHED
02-4D-013300-1	3141	UPLOCK LATCH MECHANIS	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4D-013300-2	3142	UPLOCK LATCH MECHANIS	BROKEN/UNATTACHED
02-4D-013700-2	3143	READY TO LATCH LIMIT	PREMATURE OPER
05-6ED-2126-2	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2127-1	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2127-2	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2129-1	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2130-2	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2131-1	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2131-2	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2132-2	3501	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2127-1	3502	RELAY	FAILS TO OPEN
05-6ED-2127-2	3502	RELAY	FAILS TO OPEN
05-6ED-2126-2	3503	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2129-1	3503	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2130-2	3503	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2131-1	3503	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2131-2	3503	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2132-2	3503	RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6ED-2026-3	3505	ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2026-4	3505	ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2026-3	3506	ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2026-4	3506	ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2027-2	3507	CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2027-3	3507	CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2027-2	3508	CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2027-3	3508	CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2028-3	3509	ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2030-3	3509	ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2028-3	3510	ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE	FAILS TO SWITCH

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-6ED-2030-3	3510	ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6ED-2250-1	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2251A-1	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2251A-2	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2251B-2	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2252-2	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2252B-2	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2257-2	3522	DIODE	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6ED-2251A-1	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2251A-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2251B-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2252-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2252B-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2252C-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2255-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2257-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6ED-2257A-2	3523	DIODE	SHORTED OUT
05-6EH-56060-6	4500	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4501	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4501	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4502	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4503	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4503	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4504	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4505	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4505	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4506	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4507	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4507	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4508	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4509	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4509	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4510	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4511	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4511	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4512	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4513	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4513	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-6	4514	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56060-1	4515	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56060-3	4515	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4516	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4517	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4517	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4518	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4519	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4519	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4520	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4521	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-6EH-56000-3	4521	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4522	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4523	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4523	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4524	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4525	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4525	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4526	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4527	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4527	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4528	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4529	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4529	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4530	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4531	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4531	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4532	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4533	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4533	+28V CONTACT #1	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4534	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4535	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4535	+28V CONTACT #2	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4536	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4537	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4537	+28V CONTACT #3	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-4	4538	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56000-1	4539	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-3	4539	+28V CONTACT #4	FAILS OPEN
05-6EH-56000-1	4540	TALKBACK	FAILS TO DEPLOY
05-6EH-56000-3	4540	TALKBACK	FAILS TO DEPLOY
05-6EH-56000-1	4541	TALKBACK	FAILS TO BARBERPO
05-6EH-56000-3	4541	TALKBACK	FAILS TO BARBERPO
05-6EH-56000-1	4542	TALKBACK	FAILS TO STOW
05-6EH-56000-3	4542	TALKBACK	FAILS TO STOW
05-6EH-56021-2	4545	AND GATE #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4547	AND GATE #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4549	AND GATE #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4551	AMP #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4553	AMP #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4555	AMP #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4557	AMP #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4559	K14	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4561	K68	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4563	K72	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4565	K70	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4567	STOW MICROSWITCH #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4569	DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4571	AND GATE #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4573	AND GATE #2	FAILS SHORTED

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-6EH-56020-2	4575	AND GATE #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4577	AND GATE #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4579	AMP #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4581	AMP #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4583	AMP #1	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4585	AMP #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4587	K25	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4589	K2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4592	K27	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4594	K37	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56021-2	4596	STOW MICROSWITCH #2	FAILS SHORTED
05-6EH-56020-2	4598	DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2	FAILS SHORTED
02-4B-001-2	5101	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-002-3	5101	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-005-1	5101	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-002-1	5102	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-101-1	5102	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-001-1	5104	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4B-002-1	5104	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4B-005-4	5105	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-005-6	5105	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-001-1	5106	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	SLIPS
02-4B-002-1	5106	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	SLIPS
02-4B-001-2	5107	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-002-1	5107	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-002-3	5107	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-001-1	5108	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-001-2	5108	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-002-1	5108	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-002-3	5108	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-002-1	5109	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-006-4	5109	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-002-1	5110	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T	FAILS TO OPERATE
02-4B-006-2	5111	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-007-1	5111	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-007-3	5111	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-007-2	5112	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-007-4	5112	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-001-2	5113	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	FAILS TO TRANSFER
02-4B-002-1	5113	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	FAILS TO TRANSFER
02-4B-002-3	5113	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	FAILS TO TRANSFER
02-4B-006-5	5113	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	FAILS TO TRANSFER
02-4B-002-1	5114	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-001-2	5115	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-002-1	5115	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-002-3	5115	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-006-5	5115	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-003-2	5119	CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD C	PREMATURE OPER
02-4B-112-1	5120	CENTERLINE LATCH GANG	BROKEN

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
02-4B-002-1	5121	CENTERLINE LATCH GANG	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-002-1	5122	CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-006-1	5122	CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-113-1	5123	CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE	BROKEN COMPONENT
02-4B-113-2	5123	CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE	BROKEN COMPONENT
02-4B-114-1	5123	CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE	BROKEN COMPONENT
02-4B-113-1	5124	CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE	LATCH HOOK FAILS
02-4B-110-1	5125	CENTERLINE LATCH ROLL	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-110-1	5126	CENTERLINE LATCH ROLL	BROKEN
02-4B-403-1	5127	PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-403-1	5128	PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL	BROKEN
02-4B-403-2	5128	PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL	BROKEN
02-4B-403-1	5129	PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-403-1	5130	PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-403-1	5131	PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA	BROKEN
02-4B-403-2	5131	PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA	BROKEN
02-4B-403-1	5132	PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA	BENT
02-4B-001-1	5133	BULKHEAD LATCH GANG B	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-106-1	5134	BULKHEAD LATCH GANG B	BROKEN
02-4B-001-1	5135	BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL RO	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-099-1	5136	BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL RO	BROKEN
02-4B-001-1	5137	BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-008-1	5138	BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG	BROKEN
02-4B-008-2	5138	BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG	BROKEN
02-4B-107-1	5138	BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG	BROKEN
02-4B-108-1	5138	BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG	BROKEN
02-4B-008-1	5139	BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG	FAILS TO LATCH
02-4B-001-1	5140	BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEM	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-140-2	5145	BULKHEAD READY-TO-LAT	PREMATURE OPER
02-4B-203-1	5146	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-203-1	5147	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-203-1	5149	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS TO DISENGAGE
02-4B-203-2	5150	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4B-203-1	5151	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	SLIPS
02-4B-203-1	5152	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4B-203-1	5153	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-202-1	5154	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-204-2	5155	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS TO OPERATE
02-4B-202-1	5156	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-202-2	5157	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-204-2	5157	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	PARTIAL OUTPUT
02-4B-200-1	5158	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	BROKEN
02-4B-201-1	5159	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	SEIZED BEARING
02-4B-200-1	5161	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	BROKEN SUPPORT
02-4B-202-2	5162	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-207-1	5162	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-207-2	5163	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4B-204-1	5164	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	TORQUE LIMITER
02-4B-204-1	5165	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	JAMMED ROTARY ACT

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
02-4B-209-2	5166	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	ROTARY ACTUATOR
02-4B-204-1	5167	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	BROKEN MOUNTING
02-4B-209-1	5168	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-209-2	5169	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV	BROKEN
02-4B-109-1	5176	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIG	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4B-206-1	5179	PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEA	PHYSICAL BINDING
05-6EB-2000-1	5502	CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESI	OPEN CIRCUIT
05-6EB-2001-1	5504	PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6EB-2001-2	5504	PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6EB-2010-1	5504	PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6EB-2010-2	5504	PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON	FAILS TO SWITCH
05-6EB-2011-1	5505	FUSE, 1A	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EB-2004-1	5507	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6EB-2004-2	5507	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6EB-2005-1	5507	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6EB-2005-2	5507	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-6EB-2004-2	5508	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO OPEN
05-6EB-2005-1	5508	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO OPEN
05-6EB-2005-2	5508	MAIN DC BUS RELAY	FAILS TO OPEN
02-4G-179-2	6103	MOTOR BRAKE	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-183-2	6104	TORQUE LIMITER	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4G-180-1	6107	GEARBOX	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-180-2	6108	GEARBOX	STRUCTURAL FAILURE
02-4G-181-1	6111	LATCH TORQUE SHAFT AS	PHYSICAL BINDIND
02-4G-176-1	6113	LATCH HOOK MECHANISM	FAILS TO RELEASE
02-4G-153-1	6201	MOTOR	LOSS OF OUTPUT
02-4G-153-2	6203	MOTOR BRAKE	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-155-2	6204	TORQUE LIMITER	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4G-155-1	6205	TORQUE LIMITER	FAILS OUT OF TOL
02-4G-154-2	6207	GEARBOX	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-154-3	6208	GEARBOX	STRUCTURAL FAILURE
02-4G-151-2	6211	DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHA	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-158-1	6211	DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHA	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-151-2	6212	DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACT	STRUCTURAL FAILURE
02-4G-151-3	6212	DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACT	STRUCTURAL FAILURE
02-4G-156-1	6301	HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4G-156-2	6302	HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS	STRUCTURAL FAILURE
02-4G-186-1	6302	HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS	STRUCTURAL FAILURE
05-65G-2001-01	6501	LATCH CONTROL SWITCH	FAILS TO RELEASE
05-65G-2001-01	6502	LATCH CONTROL SWITCH	FAILS IN RELEASE
05-65G-2001-01	6503	LATCH CONTROL SWITCH	FAILS TO LATCH
05-65G-2001-01	6504	LATCH CONTROL SWITCH	FAILS IN LATCH
05-6EG-2010-1	6507	RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT	FAILS TO DEPLOY
05-6EG-2010-1	6508	RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT	FAILS IN DEPLOY
05-6EG-2010-1	6509	RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT	FAILS TO STOW
05-6EG-2010-3	6509	RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT	FAILS TO STOW
05-6EG-2010-1	6510	RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT	FAILS IN STOW
05-6EG-2010-3	6510	RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT	FAILS IN STOW
02-4A-593309-1	7100	PRESSURE PORT	CLOGGED

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
02-4A-593309-1	7101	PRESSURE PORT	LEAKAGE
02-4A-593302-2	7102	O RING	LEAKAGE
02-4A-593302-2	7103	O RING	CRACKED
02-4A-593302-1	7106	ACTUATOR	BROKEN GEAR
02-4A-593302-1	7107	ACTUATOR	BROKEN SHAFT
02-4A-593302-1	7108	ACTUATOR	JAMMED
02-4A-593202-1	7109	ACTUATOR	BROKEN GEAR
02-4A-593202-1	7110	ACTUATOR	BROKEN SHAFT
02-4A-593202-1	7111	ACTUATOR	JAMMED
02-4A-593202-3	7112	O RING	CRACKED
02-4A-593202-3	7113	O RING	LEAKAGE
01-5B-380102-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380103-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380108-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380110-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380116-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380118-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380120-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380126-1	8100	ROD ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380105-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380108-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380111-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380113-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380119-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380127-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380129-1	8101	BELLCRANK	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380101-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380104-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380109-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380112-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380117-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380125-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380128-1	8102	BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380104-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380105-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380106-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380106-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380107-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380112-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380113-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380114-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380114-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380115-2	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380115-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380122-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380122-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380123-2	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380123-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380128-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
01-5B-380130-1	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380130-3	8103	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380104-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380105-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380107-2	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380107-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380112-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380113-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380114-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380114-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380115-2	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380115-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380122-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380122-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380123-2	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380123-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380128-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380130-1	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380130-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380131-2	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380131-3	8104	INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S	FAILS TO START
01-5B-380107-1	8105	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380115-1	8105	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380123-1	8105	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380131-1	8105	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	PHYSICAL BINDING
01-5B-380115-1	8106	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	FAILS TO REMAIN
01-5B-380123-1	8106	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	FAILS TO REMAIN
01-5B-380131-1	8106	DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2026A-2	8107	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2027-2	8107	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2028	8107	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2029-2	8107	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2030A-2	8107	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2031A	8107	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2026A-2	8108	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2027-2	8108	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2028	8108	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2029-2	8108	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2030A-2	8108	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2031A	8108	MICROSWITCH POSITION	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6AB-2026A-2	8502	ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2027-2	8502	ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2028	8502	ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2029-2	8502	ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2030A-2	8502	ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2031A	8502	ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2126-2	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2128-1	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2129-2	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-6AB-2130-1	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2130-2	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2133-2	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2134-2	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2135-1	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2138-1	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2139-2	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2177-1	8503	MCA AC POWER RELAY	PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-6AB-2252-1	8507	MCA DIODE	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6AB-2252-1	8508	MCA DIODE	SHORTED
05-6AB-2201-2	8511	MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR	DELAYED OPERATION
05-6AB-2202-2	8511	MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR	DELAYED OPERATION
05-6AB-2204-2	8511	MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR	DELAYED OPERATION
05-6AB-2201-2	8512	MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR	INADVERTENT OPERA
05-6AB-2202-2	8512	MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR	INADVERTENT OPERA
05-6AB-2204-2	8512	MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR	INADVERTENT OPERA
05-6AB-2201-2	8513	GPC SOFTWARE	INADVERTENT OPERA
05-6AB-2202-2	8513	GPC SOFTWARE	INADVERTENT OPERA
05-6AB-2204-2	8513	GPC SOFTWARE	INADVERTENT OPERA
05-6AB-2201-2	8517	GPC SOFTWARE	DELAYED OPERATION
05-6AB-2202-2	8517	GPC SOFTWARE	DELAYED OPERATION
05-6AB-2204-2	8517	GPC SOFTWARE	DELAYED OPERATION
02-4F-032001-1	9100	INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4F-032001-3	9100	INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4F-032001-5	9100	INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4F-032001-3	9101	INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -	FAILS TO START
02-4F-032001-4	9101	INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -	FAILS TO START
05-6EF-2003-1	9500	CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITC	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6EF-2003-2	9500	CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITC	FAILS TO REMAIN
05-6EE-2001-1	11700	FUSE (1A) MOTOR POWER	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EE-2008-2	11704	DIODE	SHORT (ELECTRICAL
05-6EE-2009-2	11706	DIODE	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EE-2012-1	11707	DIODE	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EE-2012-2	11708	DIODE	SHORT (ELECTRICAL
05-6EH-56004-2	14688	DIODE (DEPLOY CONTROL	SHORTED
05-6EH-56007-2	14689	DIODE (STOW ENABLE CI	SHORTED
05-6EH-56010-1	14690	RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EH-56010-2	14691	RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL	SHORTED
05-6EH-56011-1	14692	RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EH-56011-2	14693	RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE	SHORTED
05-6EH-56051-2	14694	DIODE (DEPLOY POS. IN	SHORTED
05-6EH-56054-1	14695	DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EH-56054-2	14696	DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT	SHORTED
05-6EH-56055-1	14697	FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCA	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EH-56056-1	14698	DIODE (STOW INITIATE)	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
05-6EH-56057-1	14699	FUSE (STOW INITIATE)	OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
02-4G-157-1	16511	BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT	FAILS TO ROTATE
02-4G-301-2	16512	SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT,	SHORTS, PREMATURE
02-4G-152-1	16513	LINKAGE ASSEMBLY	PHYSICAL BINDING

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
02-4G-184-1	16514	ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH	FAILS TO ENGAGE
05-6EG-2009-1	16515	FUSE, 1A	FAIL OPEN
05-6EG-2017-1	16516	MID MCA 1, 2, 3, 4	FAILS TO TRANSFER
02-4A-593201-1	17121	SIDE HATCH LATCH MECH	FAILS TO DISENGAG
02-4A-593203-1	17122	SIDE HATCH HINGE	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4A-593205-2	17123	SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR	PHYSICAL BINDING
02-4A-593301-2	17124	AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH M	FAILS TO ENGAGE
02-4A-593301-1	17125	AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH M	FAILS TO DISENGAG

APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS

This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-03, Analysis of the Mechanical Actuation System, (30 November 1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, 10 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the top.

LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS

Hardware Criticalities:
    1   = Loss of life or vehicle
    2   = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
          (like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
    3   = All others

Functional Criticalities:
    1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
         if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
    2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
         if failed, could cause loss of mission.

Redundancy Screen A:
    1   = Is Checked Out PreFlight
    2   = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
    3   = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
   NA = Not Applicable

Redundancy Screens B and C:
    P   = Passed Screen
    F   = Failed Screen
   NA = Not Applicable

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/16/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH   FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 17121   ABORT: /

ITEM: SIDE HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
  3) SIDE HATCH
  4) LATCH MECHANISM
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                      CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: 1/1   RTLS: /
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
       ONORBIT: 1/1   AOA: /
       DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V070-593201

CAUSES: FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS, PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING, PIECE-
PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION DURING PRELAUNCH EMERGENCY EGRESS
OR ON-ORBIT IF EMERGENCY CREWMEMBER INGRESS IS REQUIRED. THIS
ITEM NOT IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   E-2

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/16/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH   FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 17122   ABORT: /

ITEM: SIDE HATCH HINGE
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
  3) SIDE HATCH
  4) HATCH HINGE
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                         CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: 1/1   RTLS: /
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
       ONORBIT: 1/1   AOA: /
       DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V070-593202

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION/CREW DUE TO LOSS OF INGRESS CAPABILITY
DURING PRELAUNCH EMERGENCY. NOT INCLUDED AS A SEPARATE ITEM IN
IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/16/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH   FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 17123   ABORT: /

ITEM: SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR HINGE
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
  3) SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR ASSY
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                          CRITICALITIES
     FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
        PRELAUNCH: 1/1   RTLS: /
        LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
        ONORBIT: 1/1   AOA: /
        DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
        LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MC252-0002-0001

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION/CREW DUE TO LOSS OF INGRESS CAPABILITY
DURING ON-ORBIT EMERGENCY OR EGRESS CAPABILITY DURING PRELAUNCH
EMERGENCY. NOT INCLUDED AS A SEPARATE ITEM IN THE IOA DATA DROP
2.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   E-4

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/16/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH   FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 17125   ABORT: /

ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
  3) AIRLOCK
  4) HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                         CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 2/2   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301

CAUSES: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA
MISSIONS BECAUSE HATCHES CANNOT BE OPENED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   E-5

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/16/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
MDAC ID: 17124   FLIGHT: 1/1
                                                   ABORT: /

ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ENGAGE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
  3) AIRLOCK
  4) LATCH MECHANISM
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                       CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
   PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
   LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
   ONORBIT: 1/1   AOA: /
   DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
   LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE AND SEAL
HATCH B PREVENTING AIRLOCK REPRESSURIZATION. NOT INCLUDED AS A
SEPARATE ITEM IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 03/07/88   E-6

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/16/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH   FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 17126   ABORT: /

ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH LOCK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS UNLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
  3) AIRLOCK
  4) HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                    CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
       ONORBIT: 2/2   AOA: /
       DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301

CAUSES: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA
MISSIONS BECAUSE HATCHES CANNOT BE OPENED.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/25/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR   FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 16513   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
    1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
    2) PBR
    3) DEPLOYMENT
    4) LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
    5)
    6)
    7)
    8)
    9)

                        CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
        PRELAUNCH: 3/3   RTLS: 3/3
        LIFTOFF: 3/3   TAL: 3/3
        ONORBIT: 1/1   AOA: 3/3
        DEORBIT: 1/1   ATO: 3/3
        LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA]   B [NA]   C [NA]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-594410

CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN
OBJECT/DEBRIS, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL DEFECT, THERMAL
DISTORTION, VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE IF RADIATOR CANNOT BE STOWED.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/25/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR   FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 16511   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT SUPPORT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ROTATE

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PBR
  3) TORQUE SHAFT
  4) BEARING
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                        CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: 3/3   RTLS: 3/3
      LIFTOFF: 3/3   TAL: 3/3
      ONORBIT: 2/1R   AOA: 3/3
      DEORBIT: 2/1R   ATO: 3/3
      LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [3]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME131-0051-0009

CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN OBJECT
DEBRIS, SEIZED BEARING, TEMPERATURE, MISALIGNMENT

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF RADIATOR CANNOT BE STOWED AND
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CLOSED.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/25/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 16514   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH RADIATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ENGAGE

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PBR
  3) DEPLOYMENT
  4) ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                      CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: 3/3   RTLS: 3/3
       LIFTOFF: 3/3   TAL: 3/3
       ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: 3/3
       DEORBIT: 3/1R   ATO: 3/3
       LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC203-0002-0012, 19, 32, 39

CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES WEAR, CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/25/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR   FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 16512   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT, RADIATOR STOWED
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, PREMATURELY CLOSES, CONDUCTS INADVERTENTLY

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1)   MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2)   PBR
  3)   RADIATOR
  4)   SWITCH, LIMIT
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                         CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: 3/3   RTLS: 3/3
      LIFTOFF: 3/3   TAL: 3/3
      ONORBIT: 2/1R   AOA: 3/3
      DEORBIT: 2/1R   ATO: 3/3
      LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME452-0123-0003

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE MAY PREVENT STOWAGE OF RADIATORS RESULTING IN IN
ABILITY TO CLOSE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 1/28/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
MDAC ID: 11700   FLIGHT: 3/1R
                                                          ABORT: 3/1R

ITEM: FUSE (1A) MOTOR POWER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
 1)   MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
 2)   AIR DATA PROBE
 3)   PROBE ASSEMBLY
 4)
 5)
 6)
 7)
 8)
 9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE	HDW/FUNC	ABORT	HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:	/		
LIFTOFF:	/	RTLS:	3/1R
ONORBIT:	/	TAL:	3/1R
DEORBIT:	3/1R	AOA:	3/1R
LANDING/SAFING:	3/3	ATO:	/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT AIR DATA PROBE MOTOR. SECOND LOSS WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF PROBE CONTROL. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP
2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 1/28/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 11701   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) AIR DATA PROBE
  3) SWITCH SCAN - LIMIT RESISTOR
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                          CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/3
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/3
       ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/3
       DEORBIT: 3/3   ATO: 3/3
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON PROBE OPERATION. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP
2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 1/29/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 11702   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) AIR DATA PROBE
  3) LIMIT SWITCH - LIMIT RESISTOR
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                      CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/3
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/3
       ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/3
       DEORBIT: 3/3   ATO: 3/3
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT IN AIR DATA PROBE OPERATION. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO
DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 1/29/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 11703   ABORT: 3/1R

ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1)   MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2)   AIR DATA PROBE
  3)   DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH OUTPUT
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                        CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/1R
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/1R
      ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/1R
      DEORBIT: 3/1R   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LOSS OF OTHER REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT HARDWARE. NOT FOUND PRIOR TO DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 1/29/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 11704   ABORT: 3/1R

ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) AIR DATA PROBE
  3) DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH OUTPUT
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                        CRITICALITIES
      FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
        PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/1R
        LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/1R
        ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/1R
        DEORBIT: 3/1R   ATO: /
        LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANT CIRCUIT HARDWARE. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/01/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 11705   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) AIR DATA PROBE
  3) DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH SCAN
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                         CRITICALITIES
     FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
        PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/3
        LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/3
        ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/3
        DEORBIT: 3/3   ATO: /
        LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [   ]   B [   ]   C [   ]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON AIR DATA PROBE OPERATION.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/01/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 11706   ABORT: 3/1R

ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
 1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
 2) AIR DATA PROBE
 3) DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH SCAN
 4)
 5)
 6)
 7)
 8)
 9)

CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE	HDW/FUNC	ABORT	HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:	/	RTLS:	3/1R
LIFTOFF:	/	TAL:	3/1R
ONORBIT:	/	AOA:	3/1R
DEORBIT:	3/1R	ATO:	/
LANDING/SAFING:	3/3		

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER, ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANT HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA
DROP 2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/02/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 11707   ABORT: 3/1R

ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) AIR DATA PROBE
  3) HEATER CONTROL
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                        CRITICALITIES
     FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
        PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/1R
        LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/1R
        ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/1R
        DEORBIT: 3/1R   ATO: /
        LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER, ADDITIONAL
HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED IN DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/02/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
MDAC ID: 11708   FLIGHT: 3/1R
                                          ABORT: 3/1R

ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) AIR DATA PROBE
  3) HEATER CONTROL
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                          CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
     PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: 3/1R
     LIFTOFF: /   TAL: 3/1R
     ONORBIT: /   AOA: 3/1R
     DEORBIT: 3/1R   ATO: /
     LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER:

CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER ADDITIONAL
HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED IN DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/25/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16515

HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
                FLIGHT: 2/1R
                ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: FUSE, 1A
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
 1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
 2) PBR
 3) FUSE
 4)
 5)
 6)
 7)
 8)
 9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE	HDW/FUNC	ABORT	HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:	3/3	RTLS:	3/3
LIFTOFF:	3/3	TAL:	3/3
ONORBIT:	2/1R	AOA:	3/3
DEORBIT:	2/1R	ATO:	3/3
LANDING/SAFING:	3/3		

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-009-1001

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE - POSSIBLE VEHICLE LOSS AFTER SECOND
FAILURE AND INABILITY TO STOW RADIATORS.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/25/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR   FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 16516   ABORT: 3/3

ITEM: MID MCA 1, 2, 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CONDUCT, SHORTS TO
GROUND (DC SIDE)

LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) PBR
  3) MID MCA 1, 2, 3, 4
  4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                          CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: 3/3   RTLS: 3/3
       LIFTOFF: 3/3   TAL: 3/3
       ONORBIT: 2/1R   AOA: 3/3
       DEORBIT: 2/1R   ATO: 3/3
       LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [P]   C [P]

LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME455-0135-0001, -0002

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURA FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS IF VEHICLE/CREW AFTER SECOND FAILURE.

REFERENCES:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/05/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14688   ABORT: /

ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOY CONTROL)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) DEPLOY CONTROL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                       CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
       ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
       DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: THERMAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. ADDITIONAL FAILURES COULD CAUSE INADVERTENT
DEPLOY OF THE KU-BAND ANTENNA, DAMAGING ORBITER PLB
DOORS/RADIATORS. ITEM NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/05/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14689   ABORT: /

ITEM: DIODE (STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
   1)   MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
   2)   KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
   3)   ELECTRICAL
   4)   BOOM STOW ENABLE (MCA2 & 4)
   5)
   6)
   7)
   8)
   9)

                        CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: THERMAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT AFTER FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE PLB DOORS WHEN ANTENNA IS DEPLOYED. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA
DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/08/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14690   ABORT: /

ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) STOW SIGNAL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                       CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
       PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
       LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
       ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
       DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
       LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: RWR80S1211FR

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE PLB DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/08/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14691   ABORT: /

ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) STOW SIGNAL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                         CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: RWR80S1211FR

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/08/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 14692

HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
              FLIGHT: 3/1R
              ABORT: /

ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                         CRITICALITIES
  FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/09/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
MDAC ID: 14693   FLIGHT: 3/1R
                                                      ABORT: /

ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                          CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
   PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
   LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
   ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
   DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
   LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/09/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14694   ABORT: /

ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOY POS. INDICATION)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) DEPLOY POSITION INDICATOR CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                      CRITICALITIES
     FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
        PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
        LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
        ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
        DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
        LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
INADVERTENT/PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA, DAMAGING ORBITER
STRUCTURE. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/09/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14695   ABORT: /

ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

CRITICALITIES
    FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP
2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/09/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14696   ABORT: /

ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
   PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
   LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
   ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
   DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
   LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP
2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/10/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14697   ABORT: /

ITEM: FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) DEPLOY INDICATION/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

                        CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0200

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO PROVIDE STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT
IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/10/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY   HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14698   ABORT: /

ITEM: DIODE (STOW INITIATE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
  1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
  2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
  3) ELECTRICAL
  4) STOW INITIATE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
  5)
  6)
  7)
  8)
  9)

CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
   PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
   LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
   ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
   DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
   LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXV1N4246

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS WITHOUT CAUSING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO DOORS. NOT INCLUDED
IN THE IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 2/10/88   HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C   FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 14699   ABORT: /

ITEM: FUSE (STOW INITIATE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY   SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
   1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
   2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
   3) ELECTRICAL
   4) STOW INITIATE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
   5)
   6)
   7)
   8)
   9)

                        CRITICALITIES
   FLIGHT PHASE   HDW/FUNC   ABORT   HDW/FUNC
      PRELAUNCH: /   RTLS: /
      LIFTOFF: /   TAL: /
      ONORBIT: 3/1R   AOA: /
      DEORBIT: /   ATO: /
      LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]   B [F]   C [P]

LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-1001

CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
PLB DOORS WITHOUT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE DOORS. NOT INCLUDED
IN THE IOA DATA DROP 2.

REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C

APPENDIX F

NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS

This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E. The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA recommendations.

Appendix F Legend

Code Definition

None.

NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	NASA CRIT HW/F	NASA SCREENS A B C	IOA CRIT HW/F	IOA SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
	MECH/ADP-1105	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1106	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1107	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1108	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1109	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1110	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1111	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1112	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1556	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1557	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1558	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1559	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1560	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1561	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1562	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1563	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1604	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1605	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1606	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1607	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1608	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1609	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1610	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1611	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1612	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1613	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1614	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1615	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1616	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1617	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1618	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1619	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1620	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1621	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1622	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1623	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1624	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1625	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1626	/		/			
	MECH/ADP-1627	/		/			
	MECH/ESP-2106	/		/			
	MECH/ETU-3102	/		/			
	MECH/ETU-3110	/		/			
	MECH/ETU-3112	/		/			
	MECH/ETU-3119	/		/			

| IDENTIFIERS | | NASA | | | IOA RECOMMENDATIONS | | | | ISSUE |
| | | CRIT | SCREENS | | CRIT | SCREENS | | OTHER | |
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	HW/F	A B C		HW/F	A B C		(SEE LEGEND CODE)	
	MECH/ETU-3125	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3144	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3504	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3511	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3512	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3513	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3514	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3515	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3516	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3517	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3518	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3519	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3520	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3521	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3524	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3525	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3526	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3527	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3528	/			/				
	MECH/ETU-3529	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4101	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4102	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4103	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4104	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4105	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4106	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4107	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4108	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4109	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4110	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4111	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4112	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4113	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4544	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4546	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4548	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4550	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4552	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4554	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4556	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4558	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4560	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4562	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4564	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4566	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4568	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4570	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4572	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4573	/			/				
	MECH/KBD-4576	/			/				

| IDENTIFIERS | | NASA | | | IDA RECOMMENDATIONS | | | | |
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IDA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
	MECH/KBD-4578	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4580	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4582	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4584	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4586	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4588	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4591	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4593	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4595	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4597	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4599	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4600	/		/			
	MECH/K3D-4601	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4602	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4603	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4604	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4605	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4606	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4607	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4608	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4609	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4610	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4611	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4612	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4613	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4614	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4615	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4616	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4617	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4618	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4619	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4620	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4621	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4622	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4623	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4624	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4625	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4626	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4627	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4628	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4629	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4630	/		/			
	MECH/K3D-4631	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4632	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4633	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4634	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4635	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4636	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4637	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4638	/		/			

IDENTIFIERS			NASA			IOA RECOMMENDATIONS *		
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
	MECH/KBD-4639	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4640	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4641	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4642	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4643	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4644	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4645	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4646	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4647	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4648	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4649	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4650	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4651	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4652	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4653	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4654	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4655	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4656	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4657	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4658	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4659	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4660	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4661	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4662	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4663	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4664	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4665	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4666	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4667	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4668	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4669	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4670	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4671	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4672	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4673	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4674	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4675	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4676	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4677	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4678	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4679	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4680	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4681	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4682	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4683	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4684	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4685	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4686	/		/			
	MECH/KBD-4687	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5103	/		/			

| IDENTIFIERS | | NASA | | | IOA RECOMMENDATIONS * | | | | |
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
	MECH/PBD-5116	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5117	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5118	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5141	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5142	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5143	/		/			
	MECH/P3D-5144	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5148	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5160	/		/			
	MECH/P9D-5170	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5171	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5172	/		/			
	MECH/P9D-5173	/		/			
	MECH/P9D-5174	/		/			
	MECH/P9D-5175	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5177	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5179	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5501	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5503	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5506	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5509	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5510	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5511	/		/			
	MECH/P9D-5512	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5513	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5514	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5515	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5516	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5517	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-5518	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-6101	/		/			
	MECH/P9D-6102	/		/			
	MECH/PBD-6103	/		/			
	MECH/PBR-6106	/		/			
	MECH/P9R-6109	/		/			
	MECH/PBR-6110	/		/			
	MECH/PBR-6202	/		/			
	MECH/PBR-6206	/		/			
	MECH/P9R-6209	/		/			
	MECH/PBR-6210	/		/			
	MECH/PH-7104	/		/			
	MECH/PH-7105	/		/			
	MECH/PH-7114	/		/			
	MECH/PH-7115	/		/			
	MECH/PH-7116	/		/			
	MECH/PH-7117	/		/			
	MECH/SDM-9102	/		/			
	MECH/SDM-9103	/		/			
	MECH/SDM-9104	/		/			
	MECH/SDM-9105	/		/			

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IDA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A	B	C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A	B	C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
	MECH/SDM-9106	/				/					
	MECH/SDM-9107	/				/					
	MECH/SDM-9108	/				/					
	MECH/SDM-9501	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-9109	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-9501	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8504	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8505	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8506	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8509	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8510	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8514	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8515	/				/					
	MECH/VDM-8516	/				/					
01-5B-380101-1	MECH/VDM-8102	2/1R	F	P	P	/					
01-5B-380102-1	MECH/VDM-9100	1/1				/					
01-5B-380103-1	MECH/VDM-8100A	1/1				/					
01-5B-380104-1	MECH/VDM-8102A	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8103A	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104A	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380105-1	MECH/VDM-8101	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8103B	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8104B	1/1				/					
01-5B-380105-1	MECH/VDM-8103	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
01-5B-380106-3	MECH/VDM-8103C	2/1R	P	F	F	/					
01-5B-380107-1	MECH/VDM-8105	1/1				/					
01-5B-380107-2	MECH/VDM-8104	1/1				/					
01-5B-380107-3	MECH/VDM-9103D	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104C	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380108-1	MECH/VDM-8100B	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8101A	1/1				/					
01-5B-380109-1	MECH/VDM-8102B	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380110-1	MECH/VDM-8100C	1/1				/					
01-5B-380111-1	MECH/VDM-8101B	1/1				/					
01-5B-380112-1	MECH/VDM-8102C	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8103E	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104D	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380113-1	MECH/VDM-8101C	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8103F	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8104E	1/1				/					
01-5B-380114-1	MECH/VDM-8103G	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104F	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
01-5B-380114-3	MECH/VDM-8103H	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104G	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
01-5B-380115-1	MECH/VDM-8105A	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8106	1/1				/					
01-5B-380115-2	MECH/VDM-8103I	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8104H	1/1				/					
01-5B-380115-3	MECH/VDM-8103J	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104I	2/1R	F	F	P	/					

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	NASA CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A	B	C	IOA CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A	B	C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
01-5B-380116-1	MECH/VDM-8100D	1/1				/					
01-5B-380117-1	MECH/VDM-8102D	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380118-1	MECH/VDM-8100E	1/1				/					
01-5B-380119-1	MECH/VDM-8101D	1/1				/					
01-5B-380120-1	MECH/VDM-8100F	1/1				/					
01-5B-380122-1	MECH/VDM-8103K	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104J	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
01-5B-380122-3	MECH/VDM-8103L	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104K	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
01-5B-380123-1	MECH/VDM-8105B	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8106A	1/1				/					
01-5B-380123-2	MECH/VDM-8103M	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8104L	1/1				/					
01-5B-380123-3	MECH/VDM-8103N	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104M	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380125-1	MECH/VDM-8102E	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380126-1	MECH/VDM-8100G	1/1				/					
01-5B-380127-1	MECH/VDM-8101E	1/1				/					
01-5B-380128-1	MECH/VDM-8102F	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8103O	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104N	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
01-5B-380129-1	MECH/VDM-8101F	1/1				/					
01-5B-380130-1	MECH/VDM-8103P	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104O	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
01-5B-380130-3	MECH/VDM-8103Q	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
	MECH/VDM-8104P	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
01-5B-380131-1	MECH/VDM-8105C	1/1				/					
	MECH/VDM-8106B	1/1				/					
01-5B-380131-2	MECH/VDM-8104Q	1/1				/					
01-5B-380131-3	MECH/VDM-8104R	2/1R	F	F	P	/					
02-2D/4-E100-1	MECH/ESP-2100	1/1				/					
	MECH/ESP-2101	1/1				/					
	MECH/ESP-2102	1/1				/					
	MECH/ESP-2103	1/1				/					
	MECH/ESP-2104	1/1				/					
	MECH/ESP-2105	1/1				/					
02-4-052000-1	MECH/ADP-1101A	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
02-4-052000-2	MECH/ADP-1102	2/1R	P	P	P	2/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/ADP-1103	2/1R	P	P	P	2/1R	P	F	P		X
02-4-052000-4	MECH/ADP-1101	3/1R	P	F	P	/					X
02-4-052000-5	MECH/ADP-1102A	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
	MECH/ADP-1103A	2/1R	P	P	P	2/1R	P	F	P		X
02-4-052000-6	MECH/ADP-1102B	2/1R	P	P	P	2/1R	P	F	P		X
	MECH/ADP-1103B	2/1R	P	P	P	2/1R	P	F	P		X
02-4-054000-1	MECH/ADP-1104	/				3/1R	P	F	P		X
02-4A-593100-1	MECH/PH-7119	3/3				3/3					X
02-4A-593102-1	MECH/PH-7120	3/3				3/3					
02-4A-593201-1	MECH/PH-17121X	1/1				/					
02-4A-593202-1	MECH/PH-7109	1/1				1/1					
	MECH/PH-7110	1/1				1/1					

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	NASA CRIT HW/F	NASA SCREENS A	B	C	IOA CRIT HW/F	IOA SCREENS A	B	C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
02-4A-593202-1	MECH/PH-7111	1/1				1/1					X
02-4A-593202-3	MECH/PH-7112	3/2R				3/1R	P	F	P		X
	MECH/PH-7113	3/2R				3/1R	P	F	P		
02-4A-593203-1	MECH/PH-17122X	1/1				/					
02-4A-593205-2	MECH/PH-17123X	1/1				/					
02-4A-593301-1	MECH/PH-17125X	2/2	P	P	P	/					
02-4A-593301-2	MECH/PH-17124X	1/1				/					
02-4A-593302-1	MECH/PH-7106	1/1	P	P	P	1/1					
	MECH/PH-7107	1/1	P	P	P	1/1					
	MECH/PH-7108	1/1	P	P	P	1/1					X
02-4A-593302-2	MECH/PH-7102	3/2R	F	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		X
	MECH/PH-7103	3/2R	F	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		X
02-4A-593302-3	MECH/PH-17126X	2/2	P	P	P	/					X
02-4A-593309-1	MECH/PH-7100	3/3				3/1R	P	F	P		X
	MECH/PH-7101	3/3				3/1R	P	F	P		
02-4A-593402-1	MECH/PH-7119	3/3				3/3					
02-4B-001-1	MECH/PBD-5104	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/PBD-5106	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/PBD-5108B	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/PBD-5133	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/PBD-5135	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/PBD-5137	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
	MECH/PBD-5140	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
02-4B-001-2	MECH/PBD-5101	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5107	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5108	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5113	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5115	2/2R				/					
02-4B-002-1	MECH/PBD-5102A	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5104A	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5106A	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5107B	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5108C	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5109	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5110	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5113B	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5114	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5115B	1/1				/					
	MECH/PBD-5121	1/1				/					
	MECH/PDB-5122A	1/1				/					
02-4B-002-3	MECH/PBD-5101A	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5107A	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5109A	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5113A	2/2R				/					
	MECH/PBD-5115A	2/2R				/					
02-4B-003-2	MECH/PBD-5119	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
02-4B-005-1	MECH/PBD-5101B	2/1R	P	P	P	/					
02-4B-005-4	MECH/PBD-5105	2/1R	P	F	P	/					
02-4B-005-6	MECH/PBD-5105A	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
02-4B-006-1	MECH/PDB-5122	1/1									

F-9

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IDA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
02-4B-006-2	MECH/PBD-5111A	1/1		/			
02-4B-006-4	MECH/PBD-5109A	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4B-006-5	MECH/PBD-5113C	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5115C	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4B-007-1	MECH/PBD-5111B	1/1		/			
02-4B-007-2	MECH/PBD-5112	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4B-007-3	MECH/PBD-5111	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4B-007-4	MECH/PBD-5112A	3/1R	F F P	/			
02-4B-008-1	MECH/PBD-5138	2/1R	P F P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5139	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4B-008-2	MECH/PBD-5138A	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-099-1	MECH/PBD-5136	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-101-1	MECH/PBD-5102	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-106-1	MECH/PBD-5134	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-107-1	MECH/PBD-5138B	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-108-1	MECH/PBD-5138C	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-109-1	MECH/PBD-5176	1/1		/			
02-4B-110-1	MECH/PBD-5125	2/1R	P F P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5126	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4B-112-1	MECH/PBD-5120	1/1		/			
02-4B-113-1	MECH/PDB-5123	2/1R	P F P	/			
	MECH/PDB-5124	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4B-113-2	MECH/PDB-5123A	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-114-1	MECH/PDB-5123B	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4B-140-2	MECH/PBD-5145	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4B-200-1	MECH/PBD-5158	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5161	1/1		/			
02-4B-201-1	MECH/PBD-5159	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4B-202-1	MECH/PBD-5154	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5156	1/1		/			
02-4B-202-2	MECH/PBD-5157A	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5162	1/1		/			
02-4B-203-1	MECH/PBD-5146	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5147	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5149	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5151	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5152	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5153	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4B-203-2	MECH/PBD-5150	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4B-204-1	MECH/PBD-5164	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5165	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5167	1/1		/			
02-4B-204-2	MECH/PBD-5155	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5157	1/1		/			
02-4B-206-1	MECH/PBD-5179	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4B-207-1	MECH/PBD-5162A	1/1		/			
02-4B-207-2	MECH/PBD-5163	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4B-209-1	MECH/PBD-5168	1/1		/			
02-4B-209-2	MECH/PBD-5166	2/1R	P NA P	/			
	MECH/PBD-5169	2/1R	P NA P	/			

F-10

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
02-4B-403-1	MECH/PBD-5127	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5128	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5129	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5130	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5131	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5132	1/1		/			
02-4B-403-2	MECH/PBD-5128A	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBD-5131A	1/1		/			
02-4D-012000-1	MECH/ETU-3116	1/1		/			
02-4D-012100-1	MECH/ETU-3119	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3121	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3123	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3127	1/1		/			
02-4D-012100-2	MECH/ETU-3120	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3122	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3126	1/1		/			
02-4D-012600-1	MECH/ETU-3111	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3113	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3115	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3117B	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4D-012600-3	MECH/ETU-3114	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4D-012600-4	MECH/ETU-3117	1/1		/			
02-4D-012600-5	MECH/ETU-3116A	2/1R	F F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3135	2/1R	F F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3136	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4D-012700-2	MECH/ETU-3124	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4D-013000-1	MECH/ETU-3135A	1/1		/			
02-4D-013300-1	MECH/ETU-3137	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3139	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3141	1/1		/			
02-4D-013300-2	MECH/ETU-3128	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3129	1/1	X	/			
	MECH/ETU-3138	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3140	1/1		/			
	MECH/ETU-3142	1/1		/			
02-4D-013600-1	MECH/ETU-3130	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3132	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3134	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3136A	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4D-013600-3	MECH/ETU-3133	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4D-013600-4	MECH/ETU-3117A	1/1		/			
02-4D-013600-5	MECH/ETU-3116B	2/1R	F F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3117C	2/1R	F F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3131	2/1R	F F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3132A	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4D-013700-2	MECH/ETU-3143	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4D-014000-1	MECH/ETU-3108	1/1		/			
02-4D-014000-3	MECH/ETU-3106	1/1		/			
02-4D-014500-1	MECH/ETU-3101	2/1R	P F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3103	2/1R	P F P	/			

F-11

NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
02-4D-014600-1	MECH/ETU-3105	2/1R	P F P	/			
	MECH/ETU-3107	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4D-014600-3	MECH/ETU-3104	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4D-14700-2	MECH/ETU-3109	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4F-032001-1	MECH/SDM-9100A	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4F-032001-3	MECH/SDM-9100	3/1R	P F P	/			
	MECH/SDM-9101A	3/1R	P F P	/			
02-4F-032001-4	MECH/SDM-9101	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4F-032001-5	MECH/SDM-9100B	3/1R	F F P	/			
02-4G-151-2	MECH/PBR-6211	1/1		/			
	MECH/PBR-6212	1/1		/			
02-4G-151-3	MECH/PBR-6212A	1/1		/			
02-4G-152-1	MECH/PBR-16513X	1/1		/			
02-4G-152-3	MECH/PBR-6213	1/1		3/3			X
02-4G-153-1	MECH/PBR-6201	2/1R		/			
02-4G-153-2	MECH/PBR-6203	2/1R	P F P	/			
02-4G-154-2	MECH/PBR-6207	1/1		/			
02-4G-154-3	MECH/PBR-6208	1/1		/			
02-4G-155-1	MECH/PBR-6205	1/1		/			
02-4G-155-2	MECH/PBR-6204	3/1R	F F P	/			
02-4G-156-1	MECH/PBR-6301	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4G-156-2	MECH/PBR-6302	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4G-157-1	MECH/PBR-16511X	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4G-158-1	MECH/PBR-6211A	1/1		/			
02-4G-175-1	MECH/PBR-6113	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4G-179-2	MECH/PBR-6103	3/1R	P F P	/			
02-4G-180-1	MECH/PBR-6107	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4G-180-2	MECH/PBR-6108	2/1R	P P P	/			
02-4G-181-1	MECH/PBR-6111	2/1R	P NA P	/			
02-4G-181-2	MECH/PBR-6112	2/1R	P NA P	3/3			X
02-4G-182-3	MECH/PBR-6112A	2/1R	P F P	3/3			X
02-4G-183-1	MECH/PBR-6105	2/1R	F F P	3/3			X
02-4G-183-2	MECH/PBR-6104	2/1R	F F P	/			
02-4G-184-1	MECH/PBR-16514X	3/1R	P F P	/			
02-4G-186-1	MECH/PBR-6302A	/		/			
02-4G-301-2	MECH/PBR-16512X	2/1R	P P P	/			
05-6SG-2001-01	MECH/PBR-6501	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBR-6502	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBR-6503	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/PBR-6504	2/1R	P P P	/			
05-6AB-2026A-2	MECH/VDM-8107D	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/VDM-8108D	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/VDM-8502D	2/1R	P P P	/			
05-6AB-2027-2	MECH/VDM-8107A	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/VDM-8108A	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/VDM-8502A	2/1R	P P P	/			
05-6AB-2028	MECH/VDM-8107B	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/VDM-8108B	2/1R	P P P	/			
	MECH/VDM-8502B	2/1R	P P P	/			
05-6AB-2029-2	MECH/VDM-8107C	2/1R	P P P	/			

IDENTIFIERS		NASA			IOA RECOMMENDATIONS				
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C		CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)		ISSUE
05-6AB-2029-2	MECH/VDM-8108C	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8502C	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2030A-2	MECH/VDM-8107E	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8108E	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8502E	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2031A	MECH/VDM-8107	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8108	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8502	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2126-2	MECH/VDM-8503	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2128-1	MECH/VDM-8503B	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2129-2	MECH/VDM-8503C	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2130-1	MECH/VDM-8503D	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2130-2	MECH/VDM-8503E	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2133-2	MECH/VDM-8503J	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2134-2	MECH/VDM-8503F	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2135-1	MECH/VDM-8503G	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2138-1	MECH/VDM-8503H	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2139-2	MECH/VDM-8503I	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2177-1	MECH/VDM-8503A	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6AB-2201-2	MECH/VDM-8511A	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8512A	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8513A	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8517A	2/1R	P F P		/				
05-6AB-2202-2	MECH/VDM-8511	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8512	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8513	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8517	2/1R	P F P		/				
05-6AB-2204-2	MECH/VDM-8511B	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8512B	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8513B	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8517B	2/1R	P F P		/				
05-6AB-2252-1	MECH/VDM-8507	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/VDM-8508	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6EB-2000-1	MECH/PBD-5502	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6EB-2001-1	MECH/PBD-5504	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6EB-2001-2	MECH/PBD-5504A	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6EB-2004-1	MECH/PBD-5507	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6EB-2004-2	MECH/PBD-5507A	3/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/PBD-5508	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6EB-2005-1	MECH/PBD-5507B	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/PBD-5508A	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6EB-2005-2	MECH/PBD-5507C	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/PBD-5508B	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6EB-2010-1	MECH/PBD-5504B	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6EB-2010-2	MECH/PBD-5504C	2/1R	P P F		/				
05-6EB-2011-1	MECH/PBD-5505	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2026-3	MECH/ETU-3505	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3506	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2026-4	MECH/ETU-3505A	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3506A	2/1R	P P P		/				

| IDENTIFIERS | | NASA | | | IOA RECOMMENDATIONS x | | | | |
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C		CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C		OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
05-6ED-2027-2	MECH/ETU-3507	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3508	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2027-3	MECH/ETU-3507A	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3509A	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2029-3	MECH/ETU-3509	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3510	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2030-3	MECH/ETU-3509A	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3510A	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2126-2	MECH/ETU-3501G	3/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3503E	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2127-1	MECH/ETU-3501	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3502	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2127-2	MECH/ETU-3501A	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3502A	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2129-1	MECH/ETU-3501B	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3503	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2130-2	MECH/ETU-3501C	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3503A	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2131-1	MECH/ETU-3501D	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3503B	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2131-2	MECH/ETU-3501E	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3503C	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2132-2	MECH/ETU-3501F	2/1R	P P P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3503D	2/1R	P P P		/				
05-6ED-2250-1	MECH/ETU-3522	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2251A-1	MECH/ETU-3522E	3/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3523G	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2251A-2	MECH/ETU-3522F	2/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3523H	2/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2251B-2	MECH/ETU-3522C	3/1R	F F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3523E	3/1R	F F P		/				
05-6ED-2252-2	MECH/ETU-3522A	3/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3523C	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2252B-2	MECH/ETU-3522D	3/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3523F	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2252C-2	MECH/ETU-3523	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2255-2	MECH/ETU-3523A	2/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2257-2	MECH/ETU-3522B	3/1R	P F P		/				
	MECH/ETU-3523D	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6ED-2257A-2	MECH/ETU-3523B	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6EE-2001-1	MECH/ADP-11700X	3/1R			/				
05-6EE-2002-1	MECH/ADP-1500A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			
	MECH/ADP-1501A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1502A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1503A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1504A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1505A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1506A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1507A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1508A	1/1			2/1R	P F P			X

IDENTIFIERS		NASA			IOA RECOMMENDATIONS ‡				
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)		ISSUE
05-6EE-2002-1	MECH/ADP-1509A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1510A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1511A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1512A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1513A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1514A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1515A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1516A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1517A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1518A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1519A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1520A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1521A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1522A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1523A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1532A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1533A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1534A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1535A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1536A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1537A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1538A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1539A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1540A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1541A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1542A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1543A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1544A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1545A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1546A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1547A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1548A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1549A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1550A	1/1		2/1R	F F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1551A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1552A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1553A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1554A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1555A	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
05-6EE-2002-2	MECH/ADP-1500	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1501	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1502	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1503	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1504	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1505	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1506	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1507	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1508	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1509	1/1		2/1R	P F P			X
	MECH/ADP-1510	1/1		2/1R	P F P			

			NASA				IOA RECOMMENDATIONS *				
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05-6EE-2002-2	MECH/ADP-1511	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1512	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1513	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1514	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1515	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1516	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1517	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1518	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1519	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1520	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1521	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1522	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1523	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1532	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1533	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1534	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1535	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1536	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1537	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1538	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1539	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1540	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1541	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1542	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1543	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1544	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1545	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1546	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1547	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1548	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1549	1/1			2/1R	P F F				X
	MECH/ADP-1550	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1551	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1552	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1553	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1554	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1555	1/1			2/1R	P F P				X
05-6EE-2003-1	MECH/ADP-1524A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1525A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1526A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1527A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1528A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1529A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1530A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1531A	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
05-6EE-2003-2	MECH/ADP-1524B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1525B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1526B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1527B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1528B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P				

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05-6EE-2003-2	MECH/ADP-1529B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1530B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1531B	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
05-6EE-2003-3	MECH/ADP-1524	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1525	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1526	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1527	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1528	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1529	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1530	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1531	2/1R	P P P		2/1R	P P P			
05-6EE-2004-1	MECH/ADP-1565	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1567	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1573	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1575	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1581	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1583	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
05-6EE-2004-2	MECH/ADP-1564	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1566	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1572	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1574	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1580	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1582	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
05-6EE-2005-1	MECH/ADP-1569	3/3			3/3				
	MECH/ADP-1571	3/3			3/3				
	MECH/ADP-1577	3/3			3/3				
	MECH/ADP-1579	3/3			3/3				
	MECH/ADP-1585	3/3			3/3				
	MECH/ADP-1587	3/3			3/3				
05-6EE-2005-2	MECH/ADP-1568	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1570	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1576	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1578	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1584	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
	MECH/ADP-1586	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P			
05-6EE-2006-1	MECH/ADP-11701X	3/3			/				
05-6EE-2007-1	MECH/ADP-11702X	3/3			/				
05-6EE-2008-1	MECH/ADP-11703X	3/1R			/				
05-6EE-2008-2	MECH/ADP-11704X	3/1R			/				
05-6EE-2009-1	MECH/ADP-11705X	3/3			/				
05-6EE-2009-2	MECH/ADP-11706X	3/1R			/				
05-6EE-2012-1	MECH/ADP-11707X	3/1R			/				
05-6EE-2012-2	MECH/ADP-11708X	3/1R	P F P		/				
05-6EE-2014-1	MECH/ADP-1628	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X
	MECH/ADP-1629	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X
	MECH/ADP-1630	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X
	MECH/ADP-1631	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X
	MECH/ADP-1632	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X
	MECH/ADP-1633	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X
	MECH/ADP-1634	3/3			3/1R	P P P			X

IDENTIFIERS		NASA		IOA RECOMMENDATIONS *			
NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
05-6EE-2014-1	MECH/ADP-1635	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1636	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1637	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1638	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1639	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1640	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1641	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1642	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1643	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1644	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1645	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1646	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1647	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1648	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1649	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1650	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1651	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1652	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1653	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1654	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1655	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1656	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1657	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1658	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1659	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1660	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1661	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1662	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1663	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1664	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1665	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1666	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1667	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1668	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1669	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1670	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1671	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1672	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1673	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1674	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1675	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1676	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1677	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1678	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1679	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1680	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1681	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1682	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1683	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X
	MECH/ADP-1684	3/3		3/1R	P P P		X

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05-6EE-2014-1	MECH/ADP-1685	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1686	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1687	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1688	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1689	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1690	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1691	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1692	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1693	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1694	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1695	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1696	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1697	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1698	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1699	3/3			3/1R	P P P				X
05-6EE-2015-1	MECH/ADP-1601	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				
	MECH/ADP-1603	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
05-6EE-2015-2	MECH/ADP-1600	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/ADP-1602	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P P P				X
05-6EE-2016-1	MECH/ADP-1595	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1597	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P F P				
	MECH/ADP-1599	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P F P				
05-6EE-2016-2	MECH/ADP-1594	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P F P				
	MECH/ADP-1596	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P F P				
	MECH/ADP-1598	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P F P				X
05-6EE-2017-1	MECH/ADP-1589	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1591	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P F P				X
	MECH/ADP-1593	3/1R	P P P		3/1R	P F P				
05-6EE-2017-2	MECH/ADP-1588	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P F P				
	MECH/ADP-1590	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P F P				
	MECH/ADP-1592	3/1R	P F P		3/1R	P F P				
05-6EF-2003-1	MECH/SDM-9500	2/1R	P P P		/					
05-6EF-2003-2	MECH/SDM-9500A	2/1R	P P P		/					
05-6EG-2009-1	MECH/PBR-16515X	2/1R	P P P		/					
05-6EG-2010-1	MECH/PBR-6507	2/1R	P P P		/					
	MECH/PBR-6508	2/1R	P P P		/					
	MECH/PBR-6509A	2/1R	P P P		/					
	MECH/PBR-6510A	2/1R	P P P		/					
05-6EG-2010-3	MECH/PBR-6509	2/1R	P P P		/					
	MECH/PBR-6510	2/1R	P P P		/					
05-6EG-2017-1	MECH/PBR-16516X	2/1R	P P P		/					
05-6EH-56000-1	MECH/KBD-4517	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4519	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4521	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4523	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4525	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4527	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4529	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4531	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X
	MECH/KBD-4533	2/1R	P P P		3/1R	P P P				X

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05-6EH-56000-1	MECH/KBD-4535	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4537	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4539	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4540	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4541	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4542	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
05-6EH-56000-3	MECH/KBD-4517A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4519A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4521A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4523A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4525A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4527A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4529A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4531A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4533A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4535A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4537A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4539A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4540A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4541A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4542A	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
05-6EH-56000-4	MECH/KBD-4516	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4518	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4520	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4522	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4524	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4526	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4529	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4530	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4532	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4534	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4536	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
	MECH/KBD-4538	2/1R	P	P	P	3/1R	P	P	P		X
05-6EH-56004-2	MECH/KBD-14688X	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
05-6EH-56007-2	MECH/KBD-14689X	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
05-6EH-56010-1	MECH/KBD-14690X	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
05-6EH-56010-2	MECH/KBD-14691X	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
05-6EH-56011-1	MECH/KBD-14692X	3/1R	P	F	P	/					
05-6EH-56011-2	MECH/KBD-14693X	3/1R	F	F	P	/					
05-6EH-56020-2	MECH/KBD-4547	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4549	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4555	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4557	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4563	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4565	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4569	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4575	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4577	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4583	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		
	MECH/KBD-4585	3/1R	P	F	P	3/1R	P	F	P		

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NASA FMEA NUMBER	IOA ASSESSMENT NUMBER	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	CRIT HW/F	SCREENS A B C	OTHER (SEE LEGEND CODE)	ISSUE
05-6EH-56020-2	MECH/KBD-4592	3/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		
	MECH/KBD-4594	3/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		
	MECH/KBD-4598	3/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		
05-6EH-56021-2	MECH/KBD-4543	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4545	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4551	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4553	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4559	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4561	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4567	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4571	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4573	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4579	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4581	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4587	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4589	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4596	2/1R	P F P	3/1R	P F P		X
05-6EH-56051-2	MECH/KBD-14694X	3/1R	P F P	/			
05-6EH-56054-1	MECH/KBD-14695X	3/1R	P F P	/			
05-6EH-56054-2	MECH/KBD-14696X	3/1R	P F P	/			
05-6EH-56055-1	MECH/KBD-14697X	3/1R	P F P	/			
05-6EH-56056-1	MECH/KBD-14698X	3/1R	P F P	/			
05-6EH-56057-1	MECH/KBD-14699X	3/1R	P F P	/			
05-6EH-56060-1	MECH/KBD-4501	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4503	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4505	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4507	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4509	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4511	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4513	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4515	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
05-6EH-56060-3	MECH/KBD-4501A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4503A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4505A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4507A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4509A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4511A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4513A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4515A	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
05-6EH-56060-6	MECH/KBD-4500	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4502	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4504	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4506	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4508	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4510	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4512	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X
	MECH/KBD-4514	2/1R	P NA P	3/1R	P F P		X